

Abstracts

der Referate von

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EMPEROR CONSTANS II'S INTERVENTION IN ITALY AND ITS IDEOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE

PANAGIOTIS ANTONOPOULOS (UNIVERSITY OF IOANNINA)

The seventh century forms a crucial period in Byzantium's perspective towards the west, and vice versa. This is because, whereas the empire of Constantinople was recognized as the sole Roman Empire, the formation of Germanic kingdoms in the west, and the shifting of attention towards problems in the east, caused a gradual estrangement between the two sections of the Roman Ecumene.

In this context, the attempt of emperor Constans II (641-668) to assert his authority in Italy, more than a hundred years after Justinian I's absorption of it, bears important ideological significance. The question to pose is whether it constituted a war directed at the submission of the Lombard state, a war for territorial conquests in southern Italy, or simply the reassertion of imperial authority in a region in which it was permitted to decline. By taking into account the facts supplied by the narrative sources, mostly western, events that preceded and followed the expedition and the general perspective of this particular emperor, an attempt will be made to shed light on Constans' attitude, realistic chances, and the significance of his Italian expedition, both for Byzantium, and the Lombard state, as well as the Roman Church.

1176 – EIN BYZANTINISCHER KREUZZUG?

EVANGELOS CHRYSOS (ATHEN)

In einigen Publikationen der letzten Jahre (Ralph-Johannes Lilie, Paul Magdalino, Andrew Stone) wird der Kriegszug des Jahres 1176 gegen die Seldschuken in Myriokephalon als byzantinischer Kreuzzug interpretiert. In diesem Beitrag soll gezeigt werden, dass die für Byzanz sonst undenkbbare Vorstellung eines Kreuzzuges auch im Fall der genannten Expedition nicht angenommen werden kann.

Vielmehr ist auch sie als ein gewöhnlicher Krieg zur Wiederherstellung der byzantinischen Herrschaft im traditionellen Selbstverständnis des Reiches zu erklären.

Vor allem die in diesem Zusammenhang herangezogenen rhetorischen Quellen (Eustathios von Thessalonike und Euthymios Malakes) dokumentieren, wie die Expedition in ihrer Zeit und in ihrem geistigen Umfeld wahrgenommen wurde, nämlich als ein triumphaler Zug gegen die Asiaten nach dem Vorbild Alexanders des Großen, mit dem Ziel Ekbatana (aber eben nicht Jerusalem) zu erobern.

Dass Manuel jedoch im Zeitgeist des alles beherrschenden Kreuzzuggedankens in seinem diplomatischen Diskurs mit Westeuropäern die Nützlichkeit seiner Unternehmungen für deren Ziele im Nahen Osten unterstrich, ist wohl fast selbstverständlich.

**THE HOLINESS OF THE WARRIOR:
REVOLT AND REVERENCE IN THE ACRITIC BORDERLANDS**
OLOF HEILO (WIEN)

Traditional Islam is generally thought to have rejected the cult of saints. However, it instead has given a famous change of meaning to the word martyr (*šahīd*, “witness”, a direct equivalent of the Greek word) by transferring it to warriors who have died fighting for the cause of Islam.¹ In the Qur’an, which reflects the close-knit community of Muhammad, the meaning of the latter concept is clear-cut (Q 3:169), but in the borderlands it becomes as complex as its context.

In ‘Umayyad Syria and Iraq, where tribalism and imperialism struggled to control the individual, a Roman system of hire and wages had been Arabised for the employment of border warriors, but it had also been rejected by the Islamic traditionalists who regarded the ‘Umayyads as godless and tried to define a purely religious normative system of a holy warrior.² A *muğāhid* who merely fights for a personal longing after money or seeks martyrdom for personal prestige is allotted a terrible place in hell:³ for God will lift the veil from all that had been hidden⁴ and judge every man after his inner intentions (*niyya*).⁵ This is clearly an apocalyptic morality, for it denies the physical meaning of the world.⁶ But it is also strikingly individualistic: God has seen (*šahada*) the *šahīd* and the *šahīd* has seen God, and they

¹ Goldzieher, *Muhammedanische Studien* II:387ff; cf. Brunotte, “Martyrium, Vaterland und der Kult der toten Krieger” 97.

² Bonner, *Aristocratic Violence and Holy War* 24-42, 113ff, 130ff.

³ Muslim, *Saḥīḥ* 18:43 (pII:102).

⁴ al-Ghazzali, *Iḥyā ‘Ulūm ad-Dīn* IV:517.

⁵ Nawawi, *Ḥadīḥ* 1. Cf. Bonner, *Aristocratic Violence and Holy War* 122ff.

⁶ Cook, *Studies in Muslim Apocalypics* 314f. Lange, *Justice, Punishment and the Medieval Muslim Imagination* 143f, 164f.

are alone with each other in this mystic unification, where the world is excluded.⁷ Yet there does exist a world where the *šahīd* is both killed and remembered for it, and that is the world whose darkness the modern historian tries to penetrate.⁸ Thus it will be interesting to note that the sanctification of the Holy Warrior was a social phenomenon that cannot be understood from a merely ideological point of view.

On the Byzantine side of the border, the only notable effort under Nicephorus Phocas to give fallen soldiers the character of “martyrs” was rejected,⁹ but the “Holy Warrior” also remained a problematic figure within the Caliphate.

HOLY WAR AND THE HERACLIANS

WALTER E. KAEGI (UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO)

This is a reassessment of the extent to which Emperor Heraclius and his seventh-century dynastic successors (through Justinian II) engaged in or consciously sought to engage in Holy War. The issue of Holy War in the seventh century is complex. Emperor Heraclius and his immediate successors strove to lead armies and the empire piously. None of them would have regarded invocation of divine assistance and recourse to religion to motivate their soldiers and imperial subjects and strengthen their morale as inconsistent with their responsibilities as emperor. Heraclius’ first serious opponents were Sasanian Persians, who were Zoroastrians. Those who would associate the name of Heraclius with Holy War generally invoke his conduct and policies in waging war against the Sasanian Persians between 610 and 628, not his military, religious, and diplomatic stance against the newly emergent Muslim Arabs from 629 through the end of his reign in early 641.

Contemporary rhetoric and poetry praise the piety of the emperor but it would be an exaggeration to term his external political and military strategy as holy war. The surviving contemporary Armenian inscriptions indubitably describe Heraclius as pious, protected by God, but do not describe him as a holy warrior in any ordinary meaning of the term. Likewise papyri do not identify him as any holy warrior. He certainly endeavoured to invigorate armed resistance and a counteroffensive to Sasanian Persian and initial Arab/proto-Muslim raiding and military campaigns and penetrations of Byzantium’s eastern frontiers.

Muslim narrative sources in Arabic, which are recorded later than the seventh century, portray Heraclius as misguided or extremely cautious, but not as a head of state longing for or leading soldiers and his subjects in holy war. Furthermore his coinage and seals do not cast him as a holy warrior in the ordinary sense of the term.

⁷ Cf. Rumi, *Mathnavi* II:1286 for a beautiful example.

⁸ Neuwirth, “Blut und Tinte” 37-43, Brunotte, “Martyrium, Vaterland und der Kult der toten Krieger” 97-106.

⁹ Stouraitis, *Krieg und Frieden* 341ff.

There is acute and even apocalyptic anxiety for the contemporary distress of the empire but not holy war.

Heraclius, Heraclius Constantine and Constans II were committed to armed resistance, but were willing to consider diplomatic remedies. There was no refusal to make expedient short-term truces and play for time. We have a blurred situation at the death of Heraclius and during the crisis of his succession in 641. Even Heraclius' second wife Martina briefly held sway over a cautious and unstable regency that appears to have avoided any enthusiasm for anything like holy war with the incipient and newly emergent Muslims. A cautionary remark: hostile historiographical traditions written by Chalcedonian Christians hostile to Monotheletism may have caused later historians to distort, diminish, delete or de-emphasize any coverage that could be interpreted as suggesting or portraying these emperors as righteous religious warriors.

**“HOLY WAR” IN BYZANTIUM TWENTY YEARS LATER:
A QUESTION OF TERM DEFINITION AND INTERPRETATION
ATHINA KOLIA-DERMITZAKI (UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS)**

The issue of the existence of an ideology of *holy war* in Byzantium has been the subject of debate since 1991, when my monograph, examining the relevant problem, was published.

The detailed study of the Byzantine sources (4th - 12th centuries) resulted in the conclusion that Byzantium conducted a series of wars, the common feature of which was an emphasis put on the religious element, accompanied by certain specific characteristics. These wars – compared to those of Western Christendom and Islam – showed similarities with the latter, regarding their mentality and ways of propagation, while on the other hand there were differences in some of their basic features. It was thus concluded that in Byzantium a special kind of war was conducted, quite similar to the above mentioned *holy wars*, though not identical to them.

Since the term *holy war* was and still is thought of as the proper definition of crusade and jihad, a Byzantine war bearing a major part of their features should be also called a “holy war” (the quotation marks indicating the absence of such an identification despite the lack of some characteristics that have been considered as essential ones and the existence of certain other particular features).

Views opposed to such a definition (which has been also supported by the thorough study of Tia Kolbaba) were based upon an interpretation of the Byzantine conception of *just war* (*Angeliki Laiou*), identifying it with imperial war (G.-T. Dennis, N. Oikonomides), and of the text of the Eucharist, the main Divine Liturgy (R. Taft). In a recent study *just war* is presented as the dominant ideology in Byzantium, which entailed on the one hand the absolute rejection of killing in war as

Devil's work and, on the other, the notion of establishing peace within the former (4th century) boundaries of the Roman Empire. Furthermore, it is suggested that quite clear distinguishing limits have to be set between a *just* and a *holy war* (I. Stouraitis).

Since, in my opinion, such clear-cut lines do not exist – and this is exactly the main reason, among others, for the misunderstanding of the proposed existence of a “holy war” notion in Byzantium – one should proceed with a new discussion of the definition of the term *holy war*, of its relation to and interaction with the term *just war* in medieval Christian society (Eastern and Western, but especially the former) and to its interpretation in order to get at a lucid conclusion at last with respect to the meaning of “holy war” in Byzantium.

DER BYZANTINISCHE KAISER ALS KRIEGER

TAXIARCHIS KOLIAS

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Im Rahmen der Thematik “*Die Kriegsideologie der Byzantiner zwischen römischer Reichsidee und christlicher Religion*“ soll das Bild des Kaisers, des Vertreters Gottes, in Hinblick darauf diskutiert werden, inwieweit ihm militärische Eigenschaften bzw. Tugenden zugeschrieben werden. Für Zeiten oder Umstände, in denen der Kaiser als Feldherr auftritt, soll untersucht werden, ob dies mit der Verfolgung einer konkreten (Außen-)Politik und mit der offiziellen Haltung dem Krieg gegenüber zu erklären ist, oder ob ihr eher Änderungen in der Haltung der Gesellschaft zugrunde liegen, in der ein verstärktes Interesse am Krieg (Heldentum) erwachte bzw. erweckt wurde.

VON DER KIRCHENUNION DURCH KREUZZUG

ZUM KREUZZUG DURCH KIRCHENUNION

PANAGIOTIS KOURNIAKOS (BERLIN)

Anders als anlässlich des Kreuzzuges von 1204, bei dem Konstantinopel überraschend erobert wurde, ohne zuvor die „traditionellen“ Etappen eines Kreuzzuges mit diesem Ziel durchlaufen zu haben, haben Kreuzzugsideologen 1261 alle ihre Mittel und Strategien aktiviert, um die Stadt aus den Händen der Byzantiner wieder zu erobern: Predigt und finanzielle Mittel wurden eingesetzt, um den Erfolg eines antibyzantinischen Kreuzzuges zu bewirken. Die Eroberung Konstantinopels durch die Lateiner hatte, wenngleich durch das Schwert, die Kircheneinheit bewirkt und die griechische Wiedereroberung erneuerte das Schisma des Jahres 1054. Für ungefähr achtzig Jahre bedrohte ein Kreuzzug das Paläologenreich. Die kluge

Diplomatie Michaels VIII. und die politischen Probleme innerhalb der westlichen Welt, aber auch das Abtreten des auf dynastische Ansprüche gestützten legitimen Inhabers des lateinischen Kaiserreiches auf Konstantinopel (wie auch seiner Verbündeten Anjou und Valois) von der politischen Bühne Europas beendeten diese Bedrohung. Um die Haltung des politisch immer noch tonangebenden und für die finanzielle Unterstützung des Kreuzzuges wichtigen Papsttums zu mildern und die Perspektive der Wiedererrichtung des lateinischen Kaiserreiches zu beenden, versprach und schloss Michael VIII. die Kirchenunion mit dem Papst, die zu einem festen Bestandteil der byzantinischen Diplomatie mit dem Westen wurde.

Andererseits machte das Eindringen der Osmanen in das Byzantinische Reich in dieser Zeit den westlichen Einsatz notwendig, um der zunehmenden türkischen Gefahr entgegenzutreten. Nun strebte die byzantinische Diplomatie, indem sie das Misstrauen gegen die Lateiner und die Ängste vor einem lateinischen Angriff gegen die Hauptstadt zu überwinden trachtete, danach, die Kreuzzugsheere in ihre Gebiete zu holen. Somit wurde die Kirchenunion zu einem Mittel, das einerseits immer noch die Gefahr der Eroberung Konstantinopels fernhielt, aber andererseits territoriale Vorteile von der Präsenz des christlichen Heeres im Ort ziehen konnte. Der Druck der Türken auf den byzantinischen Kaiser lieferte neue Impulse für Verhandlungen einer nur noch formal gegebenen Union. Der Papst wurde zum Hauptgesprächspartner der byzantinischen Kaiser im Westen, und um die Achse Konstantinopel - Heiliger Stuhl drehte sich schließlich die byzantinische Diplomatie mit dem Westen.

Der Beitrag ist ein Versuch, auf die folgenden Fragen zu antworten: Wie äußerte sich die Kreuzzugsideologie gegen die Griechen? Wie realistisch war es, einen Kreuzzug gegen Byzanz erfolgreich zu unternehmen, und welche Bedeutung nehmen die Kreuzzugspläne gegen Byzanz in der Geschichte der Kreuzzugsbewegung ein? Wie verhielten sich die Byzantiner gegenüber diesem Phänomen aufgrund ihrer Erfahrung mit den Kreuzzügen (besonders dem Vierten) und welche Bedeutung schrieben sie der byzantinischen Unionsdiplomatie zur Veränderung der Haltung des Westens gegenüber Byzanz zu?

KRIEG UND NATIONBILDUNG IN DER *SACHSENGESCHICHTE*

WIDUKINDS VON CORVEY

STERGIOS LAITSOS (INSTITUT FÜR GESCHICHTE / UNIVERSITÄT WIEN)

Kriegerische Auseinandersetzungen und ihre Darstellung nehmen in der frühmittelalterlichen Herrschaftspraxis und dementsprechend in der historiographischen Überlieferung eine zentrale Funktion ein. Diese allgemeine Beobachtung gilt insbesondere für die *Sachsengeschichte* Widukinds von Corvey. Widukind stellt in seinem historiographischen Opus ausführlich zahlreiche kriegerische Ereignisse im Kontext des Prozesses der Landnahme (*circumcirca loca iure belli obtinent*) zur Nationbildung des Stammes der Sachsen dar. Diese gruben sich in die kollektive Erinnerung der Sachsen ein. Das Referat widmet sich der Wahrnehmung des Krieges bei Widukind und dementsprechend auch bei den

Sachsen. Von seinem sächsischen Standpunkt aus spricht er sich deutlich für die Notwendigkeit von Kriegen aus.

Daher geht der Beitrag nicht einfach den kriegerischen Ereignissen und Darstellungen in der *Sachsengeschichte* nach. Es wird das komplexe Gedankengut Widukinds angesichts der Frage nach einer sächsischen Kultur des Krieges analysiert. Die Untersuchung fokussiert einerseits auf die Begrifflichkeit des Krieges (z.B. *bellum externum, bella civilia, bellum universalis, bellum publicum, bellum inter eminentes viros, pugna, expeditio*, andererseits auf dessen Legitimierung (z.B. Sagen und Mythen oder historisch gewachsene Ideen: *imperium, libertas, patria, gentes christianaes vs gentes barbaras*) sowie auf seine Rechtfertigungsstrategien (z.B. Lebensmittel und- Geldnot, strittige Herrschaftsnachfolgefragen). Eine solche Annäherung ermöglicht es, einerseits die Vielfalt der Wahrnehmung von Krieg bzw. Gewalt bei Widukind zu beschreiben, andererseits kann so die Rolle und der Einfluss gentiler, fränkisch-imperialer bzw. römisch-christlicher Traditionen bei deren Bildung erläutert werden. Dies erlaubt es, die Wahrnehmung des Krieges im ideologischen und im pragmatischen Umfeld ihrer Entstehung, sowie der sächsischen Nationsbildung einzuordnen.

**CIVILIANS AS COMBATANTS IN BYZANTIUM:
IDEOLOGICAL VS. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
CHRISTOS G. MAKRYPOULIAS (ATHENS)**

The consensus among Byzantinists studying the empire's military history is that war and armed conflict in general were the preserves of the Byzantine state. As opposed to Western Europe, where local lords commanding feudal levies fought with each other and often with their monarchs as well, Byzantium benefited from Rome's legacy, upholding the tradition of a professional standing army ready to repel invasion or conduct its government's foreign policy at the tip of the spear point. This reality is also reflected in Byzantine political ideology, which emphasized the fact that it was the Emperor's right and duty to wage war on behalf of his Christian subjects.

A thorough investigation of the source material, however, yields evidence which indicate that regular soldiers were not the only defenders of the Byzantine realm: in many instances they seem to have been supplemented by civilians fighting in defense of their homes. Our knowledge of the existence of such non-military combatants in Byzantium is slim, to say the least, and compares poorly with the volume of scholarly research devoted to urban and rural militias active in other parts of medieval Europe. The aim of this paper is to set the stage for an effort to fill this gap, gathering all the evidence which might prove the possible existence of armed civilians within (and without) the Byzantine war machine and looking into the apparent conflict between

state ideology and the complex realities of warfare in the war-torn lands of a beleaguered Eastern Empire.

**THE IDEOLOGY OF WAR IN THE MILITARY HARANGUES
OF CONSTANTINE VII PORPHYROGENNETOS**

ATHANASIOS MARKOPOULOS
(UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS)

The two harangues attributed to the emperor Constantine VII Porphyrogenetos (945-959) and published by R. Vári (*BZ* 17, 1908, 75-85) and H. Ahrweiler (*TM* 2, 1967, 393-404) respectively are texts of singular importance when it comes to deepening our understanding of the ideological framework in which the Byzantine and Arab worlds clashed militarily in the latter half of the 10th century. In addition to their undisputed historical importance, the two texts also stand out for their intensely religious underpinnings made manifest in their immoderate use of Old Testament references. They are also imbued with the concept of the *ideal ruler* who, though not himself present on the field of battle as the ancient Roman tradition demands, was at his troops' side nonetheless, heartening and girding them with his words. The two *protreptikoi logoi* feature motifs which, employed by the Macedonian dynasty during the Porphyrogenetos' era, denote models whose origins can be traced back to the early Byzantine period.

**THE IMAGE OF THE OTHER AS ENEMY
DURING THE LATIN CAPTURE OF CONSTANTINOPLE**

DORETTA PAPADOPOULOU (ATHENS)

The term 'other', derived from Psychology, was at one time primarily used in Social Anthropology and Philosophy, but has gained a rather broad use in the historical studies in recent years. It focuses on the way an individual or a group forms a perception of another individual or group and analyses the process of this formation.

In this paper, the source for the inquiry is the historical work of Nicetas Choniates. Through the narration of the events of the Latin capture and the deeds of the Crusaders emerges the perspective of the historian, which, in turn, leads to certain observations concerning the image of the other as enemy, as it is delineated in the

scholar's work. Choniates deplors the violence of the Crusaders, ascribes impiety to them and considers their main motivation for their campaign to be pure greed and not the liberation of the Holy Land. At the same time, he attributes positive characteristics to many of their protagonists, insofar as their qualifications for leadership are concerned.

On the other hand, Choniates accuses the Byzantine emperors of incompetence and, even worse, indifference to their subjects. He also ascribes impiety and greed to them, in short a true betrayal of the Roman State. This image of the sovereign forms the opposite of the ideal leader, as it is presented in the Byzantine sources, characterized by piety, philanthropy and even self-sacrifice.

According to Nicetas Choniates, the enemy is not defined so much through racial or ethnic or religious qualities, but rather through moral criteria. In other words, the enemy can be lurking 'inside us' and not necessarily on the outside.

DIE ROLLE DES KAISERS IN DER KRIEGFÜHRUNG

PETER SCHREINER (MÜNCHEN)

Aufgaben und Funktionen des byzantinischen Kaisers sind in der Forschung schon häufig und ausführlich behandelt worden. Dabei ist allerdings die Rolle des Kaisers in der Kriegsführung nie zusammenhängend und ausführlich dargestellt worden.

Der Vortrag widmet sich sehr realen Fragen:

- (1) der Funktion des Kaisers als Feldherr im konkreten Kriegsfall,
- (2) der Delegation dieser Aufgaben und dem Eingreifen in kriegerische Unternehmungen, Kriegserklärungen und Friedensverhandlungen,
- (3) der kaiserlichen Familie und der Kriegsführung, und
- (4) bildlichen Darstellungen des Kaisers als Krieger.

DIE VORSTELLUNGEN VON KRIEG UND FRIEDEN

IN DER ALEXIAS DER ANNA KOMNENE

JANNIS STOURAITIS (UNIVERSITÄT WIEN)

Verfasst von einer gelehrten Kronprinzessin, stellt die Alexias die wichtigste byzantinische Quelle über die Regierungszeit des Alexios I. Komnenos (1081-1118) dar, in der die byzantinische Gesellschaft erneut mit der Realisierung einer Militärpolitik der großräumigen Wiederherstellung des Reiches begann und zum ersten Mal mit dem Phänomen des Kreuzzuges konfrontiert wurde. Dies verleiht dem

Werk große Bedeutung als Quelle für die byzantinische Kriegs- bzw. Friedensideologie der Zeit nach dem politischen und ideologischen Einschnitt, den die türkische Landnahme in Kleinasien nach 1071 und der erste Kreuzzug bewirkten.

Dieser Beitrag zielt darauf ab, unsere Kenntnisse von den Kriegs- und Friedensvorstellungen der byzantinischen Elite der ersten Hälfte des 12. Jahrhunderts aufgrund der Aussagen einer Insiderin zu vertiefen. In erster Linie wird der Einfluss der neuen geopolitischen, militärischen und sozialen Bedingungen der Zeit nach dem ausgehenden 11. Jahrhundert auf das traditionelle ideologische Konzept der byzantinischen „Reconquista“ bzw. „Weltherrschaft“ untersucht, das die byzantinische Friedens- und Kriegsidee bis in das 11. Jahrhundert geprägt hatte, um daran anknüpfend die Frage einer ideologischen Kontinuität bzw. Diskontinuität zu stellen. In diesem Zusammenhang werden auch die Einflüsse des Konzeptes des Kreuzzuges sowie des neuen Feindbildes „christlicher Westen“ auf das byzantinische Kriegs- und Friedenskonzept unter die Lupe genommen.

REFLECTIONS ON THE BYZANTINE WAR IDEOLOGY IN LATE BYZANTIUM

EFSTRATIA SYNKELLOU (ATHENS)

After the Latin occupation of Constantinople (1204), the Byzantine territory was split into Latin dominions, whereas the Byzantines were limited to the territories of the “states” of Nicaea, Epirus and Trebizond. Although they succeeded in recapturing Constantinople and re-establishing the Byzantine state in 1261, they could not stop the process of political fragmentation that marked the following years. The official ideology continued to follow the patterns of the past, but it had to compromise with new realities. The political and religious background (“Roman idea” – Christianity) that defined the Byzantine idea of war, was still active aiming at the maintenance of Byzantine supremacy, even in a “disintegrated” world. The emperor’s military profile, the idea of a centralised state and the imperial prerogative to wage war were some of the main elements of the prevailing ideology. The latter was enriched by the traditional perceptions of the image of the emperor and the notion of the Byzantines as God’s chosen people, which was particularly promoted by the Nicaeans. Moreover, the ideas of fighting for fatherland and freedom as well as for self-defence, recovery of Roman (imperial) land and justice (violation of treaties) legitimized Byzantine wars in the late Byzantine period. Most of the scholars of that era subscribed to the general Byzantine attitude which preferred diplomacy to war and considered the latter a last resort; however, war was inevitable, i.e. necessary, for the defense of the state. Religious leaders supported such ideas and promoted the ideal of peace, whereas they condemned war and violence. The defensive concept of war remained dominant until the fall of Constantinople to the Ottomans (1453).

This paper examines the ideological framework of Byzantine war and its reflections in Late Byzantium. Late Byzantine war ideology followed the traditional perceptions about war and political power; on the other hand, it had to adjust to new conditions and re-evaluate several ideological models which had been formed in the early and middle Byzantine period (e.g. the notion of “ecoumene”).

OPPOSITION TO ICONOCLASM AS GROUNDS FOR CIVIL WAR

WARREN TREADGOLD (SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY)

Even if the main motive for Byzantine rebellions was personal ambition, rebels naturally tried to justify themselves and to win supporters on plausible pretexts. St. Basil of Caesarea had implied that defending "piety" might justify warfare, not excluding civil war. Since under the iconoclast emperors many people considered Iconoclasm to be impious, rebels against iconoclasts might have been expected to appeal to iconophiles. Recent scholars have either denied or minimized the importance of Iconoclasm as an issue in the revolt of Cosmas against Leo III in 727, the revolt of Artavasdus against Constantine V in 741-43, and the revolt of Thomas the Slav against Michael II in 821-24. Yet our sources say that Cosmas rebelled because of Leo III's Iconoclasm, that Artavasdus was an iconophile and restored icons during his rebellion, and that Thomas had some iconophile supporters, claimed to be the iconophile emperor Constantine VI, and was crowned emperor by an iconophile Patriarch of Antioch. We have no good reason to doubt our iconophile sources' statement that Cosmas claimed opposition to Iconoclasm (then just being introduced) as the main reason for his rebellion. Artavasdus also seems to have made opposition to Iconoclasm one reason for his revolt, even though he had accepted Iconoclasm under his father-in-law Leo III. Thomas probably took a more ambiguous position on icons, especially because he appears to have depicted himself as the avenger of the iconoclast Leo V against Leo's assassin Michael II, a moderate iconoclast. Our main sources say nothing about Thomas's position on Iconoclasm, probably because they were themselves poorly informed about him; but he seems likely to have welcomed both iconophile and iconoclast supporters. Modern scholars have probably gone too far in minimizing the importance of Iconoclasm in these civil wars.